CIVIL SOCIETY AND
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Table of Contents
Introduction:
Social capital
is an aspiration to those who want to strengthen neither the state nor the
market but something in between that is the civil society. In the beginning it
was less a matter of voluntary participation but broader view of the effects of
social networks. The social capital debate met with enormous interest, as
‘‘discovering’’ and describing a new resource arouses desires. Theoretically,
however, a minimum of social capital should be a guarantee for democratic and
economic development. It was Robert D. Putnam[1]
who first held this position and he gave reasons for it in the book, Making
Democracy Work, that he wrote together with Robert Leonardi and Rafaela Y.
Nanetti. The decisive impulse for this debate was, however, given by an essay
in the Journal of Democracy (Putnam, 1995[2];
Paxton, 1999[3]:
89).
Definitional issues:
Putnam’s (1993)
analysis of democracy based on the example of Italy is seen as a milestone in
democracy research (Tarrow, 1996)[4] because
Putnam succeeded in combining historical, cultural, and institutional research
to create an independent new approach for explaining democratic stability and
economic prosperity through civic engagement. Later on several social
scientists like Bourdieu, Coleman, or Loury have proposed definitions which are
subsequently used.
Pierre Bourdieu
differentiated between three types of capital. In addition to economic capital,
according to Marx the ‘‘actual’’ capital, he recognized cultural and social
capital as being responsible for the structure of inequality in a society (Bourdieu,
1986)[5].
The allocation of cultural capital is determined above all by family origin; it
refers to the access and the practicing of class and stratum-specific knowledge
components and skills (e.g., performing music and learning classical languages
are mentioned specifically), as well as style and taste. Children from
underclass milieus thus lack not only economic, but also cultural, capital. In addition
they also lack the necessary social capital for breaking out of their status.
According to Bourdieu social capital consists primarily of the social networks
of family and relationships. The necessary contacts and connections are
generally more important for achieving a rewarding position in society than
economic and cultural capital. In contrast, Putnam’s definition starts at a
different level: ‘‘By analogy with notions of physical capital and human
capital...‘social capital’ refers to features of social organization such as
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation
for mutual benefit’’ (Putnam, 1995: 67[6]).
While social capital is assigned to a person (or family) by Bourdieu, Putnam
locates it in the public sphere: ‘‘Social capital ... is ...ordinarily a public
good, unlike conventional capital, which is ordinarily a private good’’
(Putnam, 1993: 170[7]).
According to Putnam, Bourdieu’s three forms of capital (including his definition
of social capital) can therefore all be assigned to human capital (material
values and the ‘‘infrastructure’’ belong to physical capital).
Even if it is
separated from the attribution to persons, Putnam’s concept of social capital
is hardly compatible with Coleman’s definition. In the late 1980s Coleman worked
on the operational requirements for social capital, whereby he picked up on
earlier work by Loury (1977) on education and income. In regard to social
advancement, Loury paid special attention to the social embedding in addition
to individual capabilities and established this as a new field of research. ‘‘It
may thus be useful to employ a concept of social capital to represent the
consequences of social position in facilitating acquisition of the standard
human capital characteristics’’ (Loury, 1977[8]:
176). Coleman leaves out this task by connecting different analysis levels and
describes social capital in domination and trust relationships and as a
phenomenon of collective action (free rider problem etc.). In doing so, social
capital becomes a good which, in terms of general economic exchange theory, is
explainable according to the standards of rational choice models. Social
capital is thereby both a result and a resource in exchange relations, thus an
individual characteristic and a good that varies according to the social situation:
‘‘Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a
variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all
consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions
of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital,
social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends
that would not be attainable in its absence’’ (Coleman, 1990: 302[9]).
Any kind of structural determination should explain the operational
requirements for social capital that in the end, however, remains tied to
individual persons. The network approaches of Ronald Burt (Burt, 1984, 1987,
1992[10])
and Nan Lin (1982 see also: Lin et al., 2001[11])
have a similar point of origin. Social capital arises here from relationships
between (at least) two persons (‘‘knots’’ in a network) and is conceived
through the variables information and control, which can only arise through the
relationship between the knots. One could now ask to which extent certain forms
of networks offer more or less social capital for the individual. This also
ties up with the approach of Mark social capital Granovetter (1973[12]),
who drew attention to a peculiarity of networks in his much acclaimed article
‘‘The Strength of Weak Ties.’’ Many loose contacts appear to be more favourable
for the structure of a network than a few close relationships. At the same time
it also dealt with the use of networks at the individual level. He looked at
what positions in networks and types of relationships are especially advantageous,
e.g., when looking for a job (Granovetter, 1974[13]).
None of these approaches and definitions touched off such a strong public
interest in the concept of social capital as did Putnam’s definition. For
Putnam, neither the sociology of inequality implications (as by Bourdieu),
personal advantage (as by Burt and Lin), the action theory problems at the
level of the participants (as by Coleman), nor the use for the network itself
(as by Granovetter) is relevant. For Putnam it is the environment of the
networks, as far as possible the society, that possesses social capital. For
this purpose Putnam starts with concrete, localizable places, as Jane Jacobs
(1961[14])
and Lydia J. Hanifan (1920[15])
did before him. Typical, culturally anchored social relationship structures are
sought there. We are thus dealing with a space-related approach that differs
from personal approaches. It is Putnam’s space related approach that has formed
the actual and general definition of social capital more strongly that the
participant-based approaches. This appears, e.g., in the official definitions of
the World Bank and the OECD. For the World Bank, any kind of sources and
conditions for economic development are interesting. The concept of the World Bank understands
social capital to be – in an obvious allusion to Putnam’s definition – the social
coherence of societies, especially basic normative principles of trust:
‘‘Social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable collective
action. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion ‘social capital’ is
critical for poverty alleviation and sustainable human and economic
development’’ (The World Bank, 1998[16]).
Informal, intermediary, and formal organizations are not differentiated here.
According to the World Bank definition, social capital consists of all
institutions, relationships, and norms that develop an influence on the quality
and quantity of social interaction. The goal of the World Bank is to use the potential
for an increase in social and economic growth that is attributed to social
capital and the definition turns out to be correspondingly broad. The OECD
pursues a similar concept, especially for developmental aid and advice. In the
concept of social capital used there, the social environment in which economic
growth should take place is allowed for. The inclusion of different
organizational forms in the definition of social capital (from national,
regional, and local organizations to NGOs and small neighborhood mutual aid
associations) is intended to facilitate the cooperation between and in
different groups. A loss of social capital must be counteracted by the OECD
because otherwise no endogenous development would be possible and permanent aid
and (exogenous) administrative interventions would remain permanently
necessary.
Issues:
One of the most
important issues in the study of social capital is the question of relationships
and trust attributed to the members of civil society. The nature of
relationship also becomes important. Quite obviously, we can neither treat every
form of relationship (marriage, friendship, exchange relationship, slavery) nor
every form of association (club, company, cooperative, army, religious community,
administrative bureaucracy, Mafia) equally. With regard to social capital we
always think of voluntary forms of relationships and groups that in some way
operate positively. In the simplest terms identifying a civil society as something
brought forth by non profit organisations appears easy, however, it becomes
more difficult once, one tries to find out which organisations, networks and
actions tend to support or not support the pursuits of the development of
modern society.
The question of modernity – bowling alone
Putnam (1993,
1995) starts not with organizations, but ‘‘dense networks’’ und ‘‘networks of
organized reciprocity,’’ which make possible and stabilize economic growth and
democratic development: ‘‘In fact, historical analysis suggested
that...networks of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity, far from being
an epiphenomenon of socioeconomic modernization, were a precondition for it’’
(Putnam, 1995: 67). He argues that the forms of network are important
contributor to civility. For Unites States Putnam (1995) finds a steady decline
in these forms. He argues that four factors are responsible for these: the
increased employment of women, the increased mobility, the generational change
and the increased spread of technology in leisure time (increased television
consumption). These four developments disrupt face-to-face contacts in the
communities and lead to more individual or isolated activities being carried
out. However, many others like Wuthnow, (2001)[17]
argue that increase in employment ensures better civility and that mobility
does not automatically breaks down relationships. While Postman (1985)[18]
presents a complex effect of mass media rather than simple breaking down of
relationships because of TV consumption, Putnam is accorded as having occupied
a position of antimodernist. However, Putnam more recently argues that ‘‘The
level of social engagement is higher among affluent housewives than among other
woman – they spend more time visiting friends, entertaining at home, attending
club meetings and so on’’ (Putnam, 2000: 202[19]).
Mobility, like
frequent repotting of plants, tends to disrupt root systems, and it takes time
for an uprooted individual to put down new roots. It seems plausible that the
automobile, suburbanization, and the movement to the Sun Belt have reduced the
social rootedness of the average American ...’’
(Putnam, 1995:
75). If we follow this biologistic reporting-analogy increased mobility would
always lead to an erosion of social capital. As a whole in ‘‘Bowling Alone’’ he
laments the decrease of the bonding social capital. These forms of
relationships are similar to the Gemeinschaft (in terms of To¨nnies) formed
around the ‘‘essential, organic, or natural will’’ (To¨nnies: ‘‘Wesenswillen’’)
of the participants. This contradicts the findings of network theory which
tended to see loose ties, heterogenic, and nonredundant groups to be more
successful for the bridging social capital. This would tend to correspond more
to the arbitrary-will (Ku¨rwillen) that T¨onnies ascribed to the relationships
in modern societies (Gesellschaften). Thus a considerable doubt arises about
the traditionalistic understanding of social capital and the thus predicted
decline through flexibilization and individualization. The way in which network
structures that produce bridging social capital can develop in modernly
structured civil societies must be empirically clarified.
Measuring social capital:
Club
memberships, commitment, and trust are generally used as indicators for social
capital. In a comprehensive overview of the standard quantitative research on
social capital up to now, Tristan Claridge (only available on the Internet:
www.gnudung.com) shows that most studies refer both to individual aspects and
to several aspects of the definition of social capital. Thus, for example, Cox,
and Caldwell (2000), Glaeser et al. (2000) and Newton (2001) suggest using the
variable trust to show social capital O’Connell (2003), Price (2002), Warde et
al. (2003) and Wollebaek and Selle (2003) measure on the other hand above all
memberships in formal organizations. Lappe et al. (1997), Lochner et al. (2003)
and Veenstra (2002) use both variables. Isham et al. (2002), Skrabski et al.
(2003) and Staveren (2003) suggest a mix of these variables plus reciprocity
norms. Zhao (2002), on the other hand, only operationalizes social capital as
network contacts. Grootaert (2001) finds a whole palette of indicators and index
values (including the unemployment criminality, and suicide rates and the
percentage of illegitimate children) that are included, with differing
weighting, in the measurement.
Putnam himself
applied the social capital index (SCI), an instrument made up of 14 variables
which measure five groups of characteristics (Putnam, 2000: 291): (1) community
organizational life (five variables: percent of the population who served on
committees or served as officers in local organizations, civic, and social
organizations per 1,000 inhabitants, average number of club meetings attended
last year, average number of group memberships), (2) engagement in public
affairs (two variables: turnout in presidential elections, attendance of local
public meetings), (3) community volunteerism (three variables: nonprofit
organizations per 1,000 inhabitants, average work on community projects,
average number of times volunteer work was performed), (4) informal stability
two variables) and, finally, two variables for social trust. The main focus of
the variables regarding community benefits and contacts in the SCI correspond to
the conceptual linkage of the term social capital to the community: ‘‘In other
words, these 14 indicators measure related but distinct facets of
community-based social capital, and we have combined them into a single social
capital Index’’ (Putnam, 2000: 291). The variables are, however, not analyzed
for the community or personal level, but are attributed to larger units
(states).
Relationship with state:
There are three
prevailing views. First, according
to strict liberal view any kind of governmental support for social capital must
be rejected. Many of the exemplary networks arose in conflict with the state and
its institutions, namely with a clear emancipatory concern, against
governmental arbitrariness and for more decision-making powers for individual
citizens. Second, authoritarian
approach accepts social capital only in ‘‘orderly’’ forms. For the one side
tightly organized networks serve only to ‘‘overcome’’ the free market society,
for the other they serve the destruction of democracy. Both result in the
absolute power of the form of government dictatorship, which is the opposite of
the civil society and thus does not need social capital in terms of Putnam’s
theory. Here that type of ‘‘compliance’’ is required that was used, e.g., by
the ‘‘Subbotniks’’ (‘‘voluntary’’ unpaid work on Sunday in the USSR) or the
‘‘Reichsarbeitsdienst’’ in fascist Germany. Both could be counted as social
capital, but this would be virtually absurd in the background of a clear social
capital definition. The measurement of social capital in those uncivilian
contexts would be bringing eventually low scores of social capital by using the
SCI. The third, corporatist
approaches represent a middle course between liberal and authoritarian
definitions of social capital. Here it is possible that social capital can be
promoted, in its structure (e.g., through corresponding legal protection of
associations), indirectly (through tax breaks) and directly (through
governmental subsidies). In comparisons of societies we see again and again
that there is no contradiction between a high level of engagement for the civil
society and a high level of social welfare transfers. Even in the United States
many forms of civic engagement are directly and indirectly promoted by local
government, states, and federal agencies.
The current
development in the direction of the ‘‘Longevity Society’’ (Butler, 2008)
represents the greatest potential for the social capital. The increasing share
of healthy and fit elderly, to the extent that they no longer have to provide
for their own livelihood and thus have more time for those relationships that
Putnam localizes in th ‘‘dense
networks,’’ can provide for the strengthening of social capital in a society
(cf. the entry ‘‘Civil society and the elderly’’). This is only rewarding,
however, when the premises for social capital are observed. If nothing else,
since the World Bank and the OECD consider social capital to be important for
development, the strengthening of respective infrastructures and networks will
remain in the discussion and practical recommendations will be sought. It is
self-evident that any kind of economic and democratic developments are
dependent on the sociocultural context conditions that are connected with
social capital. The strengthening of social capital in the communities is
necessary to facilitate an independent and self-supporting (endogenous)
development in local areas that extricates itself from dependence on subsidies
and from bureaucratic paternalism (through regional rulers, governmental
ministries as well as the World Bank and the OECD themselves, see Woolcock and
Naravan, 2000). For the future it is important to consider which aspects of the
variables that have been used to measure social capital up to now increase and
decrease, which of them will need to be supported, which are less relevant for the
future development, and which would tend to be detrimental.
If we regard the
theoretical considerations together with the quantitative and qualitative
findings and ask which characteristics informal groups, formal organizations or
networks should have if on the one hand they should strengthen the social
capital in their region and, on the other hand, be attractive and interesting
enough to bind individualized actors, there are four structural characteristics
that can be discussed for the future definition of social capital:
Heterogeneity or diversity:
This provides
for the characteristic of bridging. Without the representation of different
social groups in the engagement, only bonding capital would be created.
Structures with a homogeneous status hardly provide the participants with
contact and recognition in their community. Necessary for this are rules like ‘‘one
man one vote’’ in order to equalize the internal power imbalances to accomplish
group goals. In traditional contexts activities are often initiated by
Gemeinschaften that are organized with a homogeneous status (according to
castes or classes) and thus do not necessarily form productive social capital.
Bourdieu’s analysis started here: his differentiating social capital used
exclusive networks and thus tended to function in an exclusionary manner.
Networks only form social capital as a common good for the civil society when
through heterogeneous groups and direct – personal – contacts the existing
networks (families, organizations) are made accessible for the neighborhood.
Furthermore, according to the findings of network research, heterogeneous groups
are more successful as a system because they are less redundant.
Optionality:
Without a free choice, group memberships
remain compulsory communities. We can only refer to social capital when a range
of engagement possibilities is discernible. If there is no choice between
different types of engagement there are fewer possibilities for decisionmaking
and the incentive for commitment sinks. Exclusive access, ‘‘lifelong’’
membership, a threat of sanctions against members who leave the group and
loyalty to directives are the opposite of optionality and narrow the scope for
decision-making. They lead to the principle of Folg schaft which is typical for
traditionalistic sects or uncivil governmentally organized services (especially
for national defense). Social capital does not evolve as well when the
commitment invested is not perceived as a personal choice.
Status potential:
social capital does not emerge without
societal recognition for voluntary involvement. The intensity of the
participation in non profit actions must lead to an improvement of a person’s
position in the status framework in the community. This quasi benefit represents
on the one hand an individually attributable value of social capital that
cannot be replaced by wage or wage compensation benefits at present. If
involvement in nonprofit activities is
compensated by a wage-like low payment, this can have negative effects on the
status potential and on the social capital. On the other hand, the symbolic
‘‘profit’’ has to be incorporated in the societal recognition, as it is by no
means self-evident as is the case with altruistic motives (e.g., the
mother-child-relationship). When actions that serve the group are presupposed
as understood (like in traditional societies), then the element of status
potential is lacking.
Transparency:
The conspiracy
of the Mafia, secret societies and intelligence services form the typological
antipode to transparency, which is necessary for the development of civic
involvement and thus of social capital. Groups of actors and nonprofit companies
that cultivate few personal relationships with their environment, where there
is a lack of clarity about their policies, jurisdictions, and the disposition
of their funds will hardly achieve a democratizing effect and not produce any
social capital. Activities that are relevant for social capital thus require
openness ‘‘from the beginning’’ as a matter of principle.
Differing
contexts will affect the social capital in each society and each community. A
promotion of groups or structures that are not transparent, do not offer status
potential, present themselves as without alternatives for the addressees and
allow little scope for making decisions (no optionality), and are closed for
other ethnic groups, castes, classes, age groups, as well as political and
religious persuasions (little heterogeneity) will not lead to the development
of economic and political contexts and contradict the concept of social
capital.
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