INTRODUCTION:
Civil society
refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests,
purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those
of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between
state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and
negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power.
Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered
charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups,
women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations,
trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations,
coalitions and advocacy group.[1] A
healthy civil society (NGOs, unions, academia, human rights organisations) are
considered by some theorists to be important for democratization, as they give
people a unity and a common purpose.[2]
World Bank uses the term Governance as the exercise of political authority and
the use of institutional resources to manage society's problems and affairs,
which puts adequate emphasis on the involvement of civil society in
development.[3]
Theories of civil society:
Before the work
of Hegel, the term civil society was roughly equivalent to state. In using this
term, Hegel was alluding to the social domain of market exchange [in Smith’s (1976)
sense] in which individual civil agents freely engage in the pursuit of
financial wealth, and the ownership and exchange of goods. Later on many social
thinkers have developed their own brand of theories of civil society.
Jurgan Habermas:
Compared to the
concepts of the public sphere and communicative action, the concept of civil
society is definitely less prominent in Habermas’ writings. It was only in his
book Faktizita¨t und Geltung (1992)
that he sketched his ideas on civil society in a chapter entitled ‘‘On the role
of civil society and the political public sphere’’. Yet the foundation for
these reflections on civil society can be found in his earlier work, in
particular his opus magnum Theory of
Communicative Action (1981). Here he provides some hints on how to define
the public sphere against the backdrop of his general theory of society. In
discussing the exchange processes between the functionally integrated
subsystems and the life-world, Habermas attributes to the lifeworld two
‘‘institutional orders’’ (1981: 473): first, the private sphere which primarily
rests on the core family, specialises in the task of socialization and, in the
modern capitalist system, is discharged from economic functions; second, the
public sphere based on networks of communication which are intensified by
cultural institutions and, in the later stages of modernity, the mass media. In
terms of material or monetary exchanges, the state (or administrative system)
provides organizational services (e.g., infrastructures) by taking taxes. In
terms of power exchange, the state offers political decisions by expecting mass
loyalty. Thus, from the perspective of the state, the public sphere is able to
procure legitimacy. Strikingly, the category of civil society is absent in this
conceptualization. This gap is at least partially filled in some of Habermas’
later publications.
Habermas’s central concept:
His
conceptualization of civil society and the political public sphere in Faktizita¨t und Geltung is inspired by
two lines of thought. First, regarding the structure and processes of politics,
Habermas draws on a model developed by Bernhard Peters (1993).[4]
Accordingly, democratic constitutional systems are characterized by the
dissociation between the political center and its periphery. The center,
institutionally represented by administrations, judiciaries, election processes
and parliamentary bodies, has the formal authority to make decisions. The
periphery is broadly divided into an internal and external segment. The former
consists of a range of quasi-statist institutions (e.g., universities, social
security organizations) which closely interact with administrations or perform
functions that the state has delegated to them. The outer periphery, in turn,
is divided into two parts. On one hand, there exists a host of organizations
with whom state authorities coordinate in order to secure smooth implementation
of their policies. This coordination occurs mainly in informal and
non-transparent ways, as exemplified by the tripartite neo-corporatist
arrangement that exists in some countries. On the other hand, there is a vast
array of associations, private and public interest groups, social movements,
and citizen initiatives that seek to influence the state. It appears that
Habermas considers this outer periphery to be the stronghold of a politically
attentive civil society that, in extraordinary situations, has the will and
capacity to challenge the political center by the ‘‘mode of besiege’’ (1989:
475)[5].
In such a situation, the political decision-makers are forced to justify their
decisions, to engage in a public discourse, and probably to make concessions or
even to fundamentally change their position.
Second, in specifying the role and quality of civil society,
Habermas draws on the work of Cohen and Arato (1992)[6].
According to them, civil society is marked by the principles of plurality,
publicity and legality. Habermas also adopts their idea that civil society
could serve as a mediator between the political system and the lifeworld.
Through this idea, he seems to re-define the status of the public sphere. While
in 1981 he defined the public sphere, along with the private sphere, as an ‘‘institutional
order of lifeworld’’, he now understands the public sphere to be a structure
that ‘‘mediates between the private sectors of lifeworld on the one hand and
the functionally specified action systems on the other hand’’ (1992: 451)[7]
and, in other terminology, as a resonance board for those problems which have
to be solved by the political system (1992: 435).
In a recent
article Habermas (2008)[8]
further specifies his understanding of the public sphere and civil society. The
public sphere is defined as a space between the formally organized consultations
and negotiations within the center and the activities and informal talks of
civil society at the margins of the political center (2008: 164). More importantly,
Habermas elaborates on the role of the public sphere and its relationship with
civil society in both descriptive and normative terms. All participants,
whether from the center, the functional systems or civil society, engage in
political communication to influence the formation of public opinion. Even when
operating in a strategic manner (as opposed to the spirit of seeking mutual
understanding), these participants have to respect certain rules in order to
become effective: ‘‘They must contribute to the mobilization of important
themes, provable facts and convincing arguments which, in turn, are submitted
to critical examination’’ (2008: 177). This very much resembles Immanuel Kant’s
thoughts on how to establish public reason.
Habermas’s
relevance to the study of civil society theory lies in several of his
theoretical building blocks support or complement the idea of civil society,
most importantly the concepts of the (political) public sphere, the role of morality,
law and civil liberties as a precondition for a thriving civil society, and the
relevance of discourse with its central element of the ‘‘forceless force of the
better argument’’ (1971: 131)[9].
At the same time, Habermas warns us against an idealization of the role and the
potential of civil society. To him, civil society is not the heart of society
at large. Nor does he agree with attempts to reintegrate the economy into the
concept of civil society attempts primarily promoted by neo-liberal strategists
and transnational corporations. After all, according to him, modern societies
are a web of various systems and spheres which should maintain their relative
autonomy. Civil society can only unfold its complementary and critical
potential under certain conditions and in interaction with more formalized
institutions of the political center under the rule of law.
While some commentators blame Habermas for idealizing the power of
discourse and deliberation, they fail to recognize his distinction between a
highly conditional potential and empirical reality. Habermas has only slightly softened
his sceptical view of the structures and processes of political communication
(Habermas, 1990)[10].
And to the extent that political communication is shaped, if not distorted, by
the use of power and money, the civil society, which has to pass the public
sphere to influence the political decision-makers, generally remains a weak participant.
There is a lesson, then, for the passionate promoters of civil society: It is
more important to reduce the obstacles for a deliberative communicative praxis within
the public political sphere than it is to strengthen the associational web of
civil society. Also in taking a look at transnational public spheres and the
use of the Internet, Habermas is not overly optimistic that civil society will
be able to strongly influence, via the public sphere, the political
decision-making processes.
Antonio Gramsci:
Antonio Gramsci
(1891–1937), an Italian journalist and the leader of the Italian Communist
party who died in the Fascist prison, is considered one of the major
theoreticians of civil society. Gramsci’s concept of civil society, like much
of his notions and conceptions, isn’t summed up in a single place in his
writing, but rather develops gradually from early remarks in his pre-prison
writings through fragmentary and seemingly haphazard formulations in several of
his prison notebooks. While there are a few passages in the Prison Notebooks
where Gramsci addresses the concept of civil society in a more formal and
systematic way, much of his observations on civil society are intertwined with
his analyses of a wide variety of topics.
Gramscian central concept:
For Gramsci,
civil society is located within society’s superstructure (in Marxist and
Neo-Marxist thought the base is equivalent to the mode of production and the
social order enforcing it, while the superstructure is the culture, technology,
institutions, etc. which emerge from the material conditions and circumstances
of production and support it), which in Gramsci’s works, pertains to
institutions, forms of consciousness and political and cultural practices (Williams,
1978)[11].
The superstructure is the sphere of mass cultural and ideological reproduction,
and it consists of two major levels:
[O]ne that can be called civil society, that
is the ensemble of organisms commonly called private, and that of political
society, or the State. (Gramsci, 1971: 12)[12]
Since the superstructure is distinct from the
base, which consists of social relations of production of a predominately
economic character, and following Gramsci’s critique of Marxist economism, it
is often argued that Gramsci developed a three-way distinction between the
economy (the market), civil society, and the state or government. And indeed,
elsewhere Gramsci writes that ‘‘between the economic structure and the state
with its legislation and coercion stands civil society’’ (Gramsci, 1971: 209).
However, it is important to note that for
Gramsci these distinctions are only analytic or theoretical.
As Joseph Buttigieg explains: "Gramsci’s
enlarged concept of the modern State is, therefore, triadic; its three
elements, political society, civil society, and the economic sphere, are
inextricably intertwined— they are separable only for methodological or
heuristic purposes. (Buttigieg, 2005: 43)
Civil society and hegemony:
The concept of
Hegemony is central to Gramsci’s idea of civil society. Gramsci’s idea of
hegemony is based on Marx’s notion of ‘‘false consciousness,’’ which is a state
in which the members of the dominated classes are ideologically blinded to
their subordinate position in the social structure. Thanks to false
consciousness, true class consciousness is hindered by the ideology of the
ruling class, and the masses are made to identify with a system which exploits
them and its underlying ideology. Gramsci used the term ‘‘hegemony’’ to name
the process of political domination through ideological domination. He showed
how dominant elites use the state as well as the popular culture, mass media,
education, and religion to reinforce an ideology which supports their position
in the relations of force. Gramsci defines hegemony as a form of control
exercised by a dominant class over subaltern groups in society. Although in
his prison writings Gramsci typically is careful not to use Marxist terminology
such as ‘‘class,’’ and ‘‘proletariat’’ (because his work was read by a Fascist
censor), his class distinctions reflect the reality of his place and time.
Gramsci’s dominant class was the bourgeoisie, the modern Capitalists, owners of
the means of social production and employers of waged labor; and the central
subordinate class was the proletariat, but also other subaltern groups.
Gramsci’s hegemony refers to a process of moral and intellectual leadership
through which dominated or subordinate classes succumb to their own domination
by ruling classes, as opposed to being simply forced or coerced into accepting
inferior positions. Hegemony, thus, refers to a sociopolitical situation or as
Gramsci calls it ‘‘a moment,’’ in which there is an alignment of the superstructure
(the dominant ideology) with the base (class divisions and the economic and
political practices that support them). In hegemony, a certain way of life and
thought is dominant, and is diffused throughout society to inform norms, values
and tastes, political practices, and social relations (Showstack-Sassoon,
1982). Hegemony thus saturates the society to such an extent that it
corresponds to the reality of social experience. In this way, people contribute
to the continued dominance of the ruling class, by accepting the dominant
culture’s values and assumptions as their own: repression is replaced by
inculcation (Moen, 1998[13]).
Class dominance, as theorized by
Gramsci, results from a combination of coercion and consent. The dominant class
becomes hegemonic and promotes it own ideology as the commonsensical way of
thinking through leadership and persuasion, so that instead of imposing itself
on the subaltern classes, it acquires their consensus. Naturally, coercion is
never completely missing from arrangements of power, but in hegemonic
arrangements what matters is the power of ideas and the politics of consent,
while force and coercion are less visible (Rupert, 2005[14]).
Since hegemony is not a result of imposition but rather of consent, this
leadership is not exercised primarily through the mechanisms of government,
rather it is acquired chiefly in the sphere of civil society where consensus is
generated. In order for the hegemonic groups to control political society with
the consent of the governed, that is for them to be ‘‘hegemonic,’’ they must
allow for a space where free association and action (or a belief of free
association and action) is allowed. When the ideas and worldviews formed in
this ‘‘free’’ space buttress existing social, economic, and political
arrangements, they are thought of as doing so willingly and spontaneously. In
this, the action within civil society, directed by hegemonic elites and the
forma mentis they engender, serves to legitimize existing arrangements and
relations of power.
Achieving a
hegemonic position in civil society is resolutely more important to the ruling
classes than gaining control over government. Controlling government allows
hegemonic groups to use the legitimate force of the state to protect their
interests, if they must. However, relying only on brute force as their only
source of power would make them vulnerable to a simple straight-on challenge on
the control of legitimate force such as in a coup d’´etat. Contrastingly,
hegemony causes potential opposing groups to consent with the dominant groups’
control and identify with its ideology, and this is likely to prevent a coup
d’e´tat from occurring in the first place.
Therefore, civil
society is the arena where the prevailing hegemony in the modern state is
constantly being reinforced, but also the only arena where it can be truly
contested. Since in Gramsci’s thought civil society, and not the state as in
Hegel, is the active and positive element in historical developments, it is the
locus of impending change. It is the creative space, where subaltern groups can
coalesce and engage in a counter-hegemonic effort to alter society
(Showstack-Sassoon, 1982[15]).
Actually, hegemony necessitates counter-hegemony, since it creates
contradictions that cause unrest among subaltern groups. Hegemony and
counter-hegemony are best seen as ‘‘simultaneous double movements’’ that
reciprocally shape one another – hegemony informs counter-hegemony, and
counter-hegemonic efforts cause hegemonic forces to realign and reorganize
themselves (Persaud, 2001: 49)[16].
State and civil society:
Gramsci’s use of hegemony cannot be
understood apart from other concepts he developed, including those of ‘‘State’’
and ‘‘Civil Society.’’ Actually, what sets hegemony apart from domination is
the symbiosis between government and civil society. This can only be analyzed
in a meaningful way when one understands that civil society is not separate
from or exclusively opposed to the state (Buttigieg, 2005)[17].
He saw civil society as a part of his notion of the ‘‘integral state’’
(Gramsci, 1971: 267[18]).
In fact, although political society is the most immediately visible aspect of
the state, civil society is its most resilient constitutive element. The
intricate, organic relationships between civil society and political society is
what produces hegemony, and thus makes it possible for certain classes of
society to dominate the state and maintain their dominance, perpetuating the
subalternity of other classes. Political society and civil society mutually
reinforce each other to the advantage of certain classes, groups, and institutions.
Control of the state is accomplished through hegemony in civil society,
hegemony that is achieved through consent. But consent of the subaltern groups
to hegemonic ideology is not a truly free choice; it is manufactured and manipulated
by the dominant classes who control certain institutions of civil society,
co-opt others, and infuse the rest with the forma mentis that they desire.
Civil Society as a Revolutionary Project:
Gramsci’s
elaboration of the concept of civil society is not just a theoretical or
philosophical project. It is set up expressly to develop a revolutionary
strategy that would disable the coercive apparatus of the state, allow
subaltern groups to gain access to political power, and create the conditions
that could give rise to a consensual society wherein no individual or group is
reduced to a subaltern status (Anderson, 1976)[19].
Gramsci’s transformation of society starts in civil society, and ideally ends
with the complete extension of civil society so that it no longer needs a
coercive apparatus to protect it. The existence of civil society and the
necessity of hegemonic elites to permit some freedom of action within it
(otherwise they rely on force alone, and cannot achieve hegemony) provide the
space and opportunity for counter-hegemonic mobilization. The subaltern state
provides the incentive. The reliance of the modern liberal state on acquiring
dominance through hegemony (that is, through generating consent in civil
society) brings about the very cultural, social, and political formations that
challenge hegemony. Hegemony in Gramsci’s view is not a final and unchangeable
state, but rather an unstable result of an ongoing process of political and
ideological altercation, which he called ‘‘war of position’’ and which takes
the form of a ‘‘reciprocal siege’’ between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic actors.
Cohen and Arato
have made valuable contribution to the theory of civil society, especially in
their collaborative publication in 1992 – “Civil
society and political theory.” [20]
Influences:
Cohen and Arato
have referred to many notable scholars of the civil society theory, of which
mentioning a few is necessary.
Hannah
Arend’s politics,
which sees politics as decaying
because of looming expansion of plurality leading towards a blurred boundary of
publics and privateness.
Carl
Schmitt argues
that continued political democratization leads to the loss of state neutrality
and to actions by the state affected by private interests. In addition to the
overlapping of government actions and private interest, the private sphere is
politicized because of expanding state activities.
Habermas shares with Schmitt the diagnosis that state interventionism is
expanding and that the political space is occupied by corporatism of private
interests and adds the culturally and theoretically pessimistic thesis of
manipulated mass culture, which leads to the disintegration of the public as
mediating agent between civil society and state.
However, Cohen
and Arato rejected the idea of decaying politics. They reject the
differentiation of state and society and contrary to Habermas’s thesis of decay
of public sphere they refer to associations of society as an issuer of public
processes.
Michel
Foucault’s discussion on the theory of
power, which analyses society as a network of relationships of power, lead
Cohen and Arato discuss the scope and outlines of the concept of power in civil
society theory.
Systems
theory has left significant impact on Cohen
& Arato’s theory. Luhmann’s system-theoretical analysis of societal
differentiation processes denies further theoretical value to the basic
distinction between state and society: According to Luhmann, the variety of
externally differentiated societal subsystems, the internal differentiation of
the political system and the many specific intersystem connections cannot be
sufficiently analyzed any more by such dichotomic theory concepts.
Cohen and Arato’s central concept:
Cohen and Arato
give an overview of the development of the concept of civil society in the twentieth
century. The starting point for this development is the categorical
differentiation between economy, civil society and state. In order to avoid
such conceptual weaknesses, where, Gamsci with a Marxian perspective reduces
civil society to a form of cultural domination in capitalism and Talcott
Persons’s reduction of civil society towards “societal community” Cohen and
Arato resort back to the differentiation of systems (state/economy) and the living
world (civil society) introduced by Ju¨rgen Habermas.
Civil society – the concept
They discuss
societal framework conditions and civil societal actors, framed by thoughts on
political ethics at the beginning and a discussion of civil disobedience at the
end. At the center of the argument are the ethics of discourse and the theory
of law. It is evident, that in connection with the conception of political
ethics the term politics is defined based on the concept of civil society. The
concept of politics championed by Cohen and Arato specifically take into
consideration the cultural aspects of political action and what effect they
have in processes of articulation of interests and interpretation of needs. In
that sense, politics is not a process reduced to negotiating and aggregating
interests; not the existing interests of individuals, but the formation of
interests of civil societal actors while networking in a coordinated way. This
developed grown political knowledge moves quite far from politics as a pursuit
of conflicting interests and as a negotiation of interests and focuses on the
legitimizing sensible side of political action in political society.
Cohen and Arato
follow Habermas’social theory. Using the concept of institutional
intermediation, they would like to discuss options and scope of democratizing
the question of differentiation – increasing the weight of Habermasian
thoughts. Institutional ‘‘sensors’’ and ‘‘receptors’’ in societal subsystems
are supposed to keep the system integration sensitive to the requirements of
social integration. They do not orient themselves defensively to the
Habermasian thesis of ‘‘colonialization of the living world’’ in the sense of
looking for barriers against the escalating dynamic of system integration. In
fact, Cohen and Arato aggressively look for possible forms of ‘‘self-limiting’’
influence of civil society on the state and economy through institutional
intermediation (Habermas has followed them later on this point). With that
institutional intermediation, the democratization of differentiated societies
without the price of external differentiation and subsequent loss of
effectiveness in connection should become possible. Unfortunately, substantiating
this theoretically promising goal is one of the weaker parts of their main
work.
Social movement inputs:
In social
movements, a phenomenon especially prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, Cohen and
Arato see the self-limiting radicalism at work they themselves demanded which
connects defending and democratizing civil society to forms of influence on
state and economy, which does not call into question the complexity level of
structural differentiation as such.
The Resource Mobilisation and New Social Movements:
The argument
proceeds in two steps: At first, Cohen and Arato carve out the alternate
unilateralism of the American research on movements
(Resource-Mobilization-Approach, RMA) and European research on movements (New
Social Movements approach, NSB-approach). RMA methodically assumes social
movements to be strategic actors, particularly, through Rational Choice. A look
at structures of political opportunities of movement organizations complements
the RMA paradigm, which concentrates on their contribution to the formation of
interest organizations. Here, RMA’s analytic framework also works for Cohen and
Arato. What the approach cannot do is to analyze collective actions below the
threshold of interest conflict and strategic actions. Civil society’s actors use
political public processes to influence political society and forms of
‘‘politics of identity’’ in civil society that aim to form (group) identities
but do not tackle the democratization of social relationships. In this area the
analytical power of the NSB approach can be used with its attention to cultural
processes, development of social identities or normative changes and
relationships between associations.
Implications:
Through
differentiation between civil society and political society, Cohen and Arato’s
concept of civil society isable to assign both approaches to the research on
movement an appropriate place and to support their alternate emphasis for
political theory. Concerning the two paradigms of research on movements, the
authors distinguish between different forms of politics: Civil societal actors
emerge through politics of identity; civil societal actors enter the sphere of
activity of political society in forms of inclusive politics; through politics
of influence civil societal actors participate in public political discourse and
influence political societal actors; reform politics is the institutional
establishing of discursive elements as ‘‘sensors’’ and ‘‘receptors’’ in the
societal subsystems, also establishing the political and economic society.
According to Cohen and Arato, social movements are found in the whole broad
scale of different forms of politics and act in civil society as well as in the
political society. Movement politics are a normal part of self-democratizing
civil societies.
Although Ernest Gellner was an erudite
polymath whose expertise covered such diverse research fields as kinship studies,
nationalism, civil society, Islam, psychoanalysis, postmodernism, state
socialism, analytical philosophy and historical sociology, his intellectual
preoccupation was focused on one central puzzle: how the modern social form
came into being and in particular to what extent modernity is unique relative
to all other social orders? The key to unlock this puzzle was to be found in
comparing and contrasting two historically dominant forms of social organization:
the agrarian and industrial world.
Central concept of Ernest Gellner:
For Gellner
(1994)[21]
civil society is more than a cluster of nongovernmental institutions and
associations which are independent and strong enough to counterbalance the state.
Although civil society requires the existence of autonomous and powerful
nongovernmental bodies which can keep the state authority in check without
paralyzing its role as an arbitrator between group interests and an essential
keeper of internal peace these characteristics are insufficient for the
existence of a fully fledged civil society. In Gellner’s view the indispensable
ingredient of civil society is an individual autonomy. Any concept of civil
society that does not incorporate an emphasis on the personal liberty, in
Gellner’s view, cannot differentiate between civil society proper and the
premodern segmentary communities. In other words many traditional patrimonial
collectivities such as clans, lineages, bands, or tribes were characterized by
a substantial degree of autonomy vis-`a-vis central authorities, often being in
position to strongly challenge the will of the rulers. However as these
collectivities clearly lacked a sense of individual freedom and were governed
by the strict ritualistic practices they had little, if anything, in common
with the civil society. Rather, as Gellner (1994: 7) puts it one could escape
the tyranny of kings at the expense of living under the tyranny of cousins.
That is, the only way one could evade the oppression of the central authority
in premodern world is through the obedience to a particular social subgroup.
Hence in his theory civil society is conceptualized in wider and historically
specific terms as a distinctly modern social order amiable to proliferation of
independent associations which do not stifle one’s personal liberty.
Since the emergence
of civil society is firmly tied to modernity Gellner argues that one of the key
preconditions for it to happen involves the structural transformation in human
relations: from the rigidities of social status to flexibilities of contractual
arrangements. Consequently Gellner (1995) depicts modern individuals as
‘‘modular’’ creatures who, just like modular furniture units, are variable and
adaptable to ever changing conditions and opportunities of the modern world. In
his view modularity is the precondition of civil society as under modern
conditions one has the freedom to change memberships in various associations,
to switch allegiances and loyalties to distinct subgroupings without being
automatically ostracized from the society. Unlike the agrarian world where
one’s social status and communal membership were inscribed on birth and
regularly reinforced through ritual and coercion and thus were not particularly
efficient, the human relationships in the industrial world derive their
efficiency from their flexibility, instrumentality, and temporary character. In
Gellner’s (1994: 103) witty and colorful language one can join a modern
political party ‘‘without slaughtering a sheep’’ and one can leave it ‘‘without
incurring the death penalty for apostasy.’’
In Gellner’s
view liberal individualism is a distinct feature of civil society and as such
it was bound to find itself on the collision course with the stringent
collectivist ethos of nationalism. Hence much of the twentieth century saw
nationalist movements as hostile opponents of civil society.
Relevance:
Contemporary
relevance of Gellner’s theory of civil society can be summarized in three main
points. Firstly, Gellner proposes that civil society can only flourish in modern
context where the separation of political and socioeconomic spheres clearly
exists. If this precondition is to be met, a balance of power between market
regulators and state authorities is essential to ensure scope for actions and
relationships that transcend both kinship ties and extreme individualism.
Secondly,
Gellner suggests that civil society requires modular persons who are engaged in
a whole set of relationships but free to leave any associations without fear of
stigmatization. Modularity is another precondition for a functional civil
society since allegiance to a specific group is transferable within conditions
of modernity.
Finally,
Gellner’s concept of civil society offers a broader understanding of the conditions
of modern life than most standard liberal democratic models. While context of
liberal democracy may be conducive to extreme individualism, atomization,
social isolation and formal recognition (but possibly poor implementation) of
political freedoms and human rights, Gellner’s idea of civil society is focused
on the institutional preconditions necessary for the emergence and persistence
of a thriving civil society.
[3]Managing Development, The
Governance dimension. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/03/07/000090341_20060307104630/Rendered/PDF/34899.pdf
on April, 11, 2011
[5] Habermas, J. (1989). Volkssouver¨anit¨at als Verfahren. Ein
normative Begriff von O¨ ffentlichkeit. Merkur,
43(6), 465–477.
[8] Habermas, J. (2008). Hat die Demokratie noch eine epistemische
Dimension? Empirische Forschung und normative Theorie. In Habermas, Ju¨rgen
(Ed.), Ach, Europa. Kleine Politische Schriften XI. Frankfurt/ M.: Suhrkamp.
[9] Habermas, J. (1971). Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der
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Sozialtechnologie (pp. 101–141). Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
[10] Habermas, J. (1990). Vorwort zur Neuauflage. In Habermas, Ju¨rgen
(Ed.), Strukturwandel der ¨Offentlichkeit
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[12] Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio
Gramsci. London: Lawrence &
Wishart.
[13] Moen, D. G. (1998). Analysis of social transformative movements in
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